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Abstract 
This paper discusses the methodology and design of the Cooperative Research Centre for Rail 
Innovation’s national low-cost level crossing trial programme currently being conducted in Australia. 
Three suppliers of innovative low-cost level crossing warning devices were chosen through a 
tendering and evaluation process. The paper outlines the acceptance criteria that were used to select 
the suppliers and describes the different types of train detection technologies and innovative cost-
reduction solutions that are being tested as part of the trial. The trial is being hosted by three major 
railways in three different regions in Australia, where systems from the three suppliers have been 
installed parallel to a baseline conventional track-circuit based level crossing at each site. 
The paper discusses our experience to date, the trialling process and the challenges that the project 
has confronted in order to develop a nationally consistent trialling programme. 
1 Introduction 
Level crossings continue to represent a significant safety concern for railway operators in Australia. 
Approximately a third of all rail-related fatalities during the ten-year period between 2000 and 2009 
occurred as a result of collisions between road vehicles and trains at level crossings [1]. During this 
period there were a total of 695 collisions that resulted in 97 fatalities [1]. These figures exclude 
suicides and pedestrian fatalities at level crossings. 
Due to the large expanse of land traversed by Australian railways, there are in excess of 23,500 level 
crossings of which approximately 21% have active protection (flashing lights, boom barriers) and 
8,838 interface with public roads [2]. While the risk at low-exposure level crossings with passive 
controls may not be significant, collectively they contribute to a substantial proportion of operating 
risk. Approximately 45% of collisions (312) occurred at level crossings with passive controls between 
2000 and 2009 [1], the majority occurring at public level crossings. The cost of upgrading public level 
crossings with passive controls (approximately 5,900) based on a 2012 lifecycle costing estimate of 
current type-approved level crossing technology, would exceed AU$ 3.25 Billion.  
Low-cost level crossing warning technology has the potential to provide railway operators with a cost-
effective control that can significantly improve safety. The lower cost enables rail operators to upgrade 
more level crossings for a given budget, resulting in a larger and earlier safety benefit than 
incremental upgrades using existing level crossing warning devices. 
The Australian industry has been investigating low-cost level crossings for more than 20 years. In 
1989, the Victorian coroner, G. Johnstone, recommended the urgent consideration and 
implementation of low-cost alternatives for protecting level crossings [3]. Since then, the rail industry 
has struggled to move forward on the adoption of such alternatives, confronted by technical and legal 
obstacles. A national approach was needed to progress such work (both technically and legally) and 
the CRC for Rail Innovation, at the request of rail industry, is coordinating a low-cost level crossing 
national trial programme.  
Technologies from three suppliers at sites hosted by railways in Queensland, New South Wales and 
Victoria are being trialled in shadow-mode, where systems to be tested have been installed in parallel 
to existing level crossing warning systems based on track circuits without operating the road user 
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interface. Both the existing systems and the test systems are logged, facilitating the collection of 
comparative performance data without affecting the safety of the rail level crossings.  
The project has enabled industry to develop a set of nationally consistent requirements and to collect 
data with a nationally consistent methodology. This effectively multiplies the benefits of trialling, as the 
rail industry will obtain three times the amount of data for a fraction of the cost of a trial hosted by a 
single railway. The larger amounts of data collected in a variety of environmental and operating 
conditions provide higher levels of assurance that the candidate systems operate as designed. In 
addition, a nationally consistent set of requirements and trial data that meets type approval 
requirements of all jurisdictions reduces the burden on suppliers to provide different sets of evidence 
and meet different requirements for each jurisdiction. This results in better prices for the industry 
This paper will provide an overview of low-cost level crossings and the CRC for Rail Innovation’s 
national trial programme. Additionally, the paper will describe supplier selection process, detail the 
successful suppliers and provide an overview of trial sites and data collection methodology. The 
paper concludes with an overview of future milestones in the trial programme. 
2 Low-Cost Level Crossings 
Low-cost level crossing warning devices (LCLCWDs) are characterized by the use of innovative and 
alternative technologies to reduce lifecycle costs of level crossing warning devices including cost of 
equipment, installation, maintenance and operating costs [4]. 
2.1 Characteristics 
The project steering committee, consisting of representation from six Australian railways; 
Queensland, Victoria, NSW and South Australian departments of transportation; and railway industry 
associations, developed a nationally consistent LCLCWD requirement specification providing 
guidance to developers and suppliers of low-cost level crossing technology [5]. LCLCWDs are 
intended for deployment at low-exposure level crossings with passive controls. They are not intended 
to be a substitute or replacement for existing level crossing warning devices at high-exposure level 
crossings. The definition of a low-exposure site has been qualitatively defined as a single-track site 
with relatively low volumes of rail and road traffic. The committee determined that rather than 
quantifying low traffic volumes, the definition of exposure should be based on an assessment of risk 
taking into consideration factors including the presence of passenger services and equivalent persons 
per hour exposed to the risk. Installation of LCLCWD equipment at locations other than defined above 
would be dependent on the risk appetite of the relevant organisation. 
In order to eliminate risk associated with the use of an alternative road user interface, LCLCWDs are 
required to provide an interface that meets the requirements set out in AS1742.7 [6] for a standard 
configuration including RX5 flashing light assemblies, making LCLCWDs indistinguishable from 
existing level crossing warning devices to the road user. 
Reaching agreement for safety requirements of LCLCWDs was more challenging. Higher levels of 
safety integrity require more demanding development processes, resulting in significantly higher 
development costs [4]. Legal advice sought by the CRC for Rail Innovation required a position to be 
taken that does not advocate the use of less than fail-safe interventions in a manner inconsistent with 
duty of care obligations. As such, the committee has agreed to an approach whereby the safety 
integrity of LCLCWDs (i.e. for the safety function: provide adequate warning for an approaching train) 
is commensurate with the required level of risk reduction to meet safety targets (i.e. collision rate that 
meets risk acceptance criteria) [7]. The magnitude of risk reduction required to meet safety targets for 
a low-exposure level crossing would therefore be less than that required for higher-risk level 
crossings, supporting the argument for level crossings warning devices with a lower level of safety 
integrity. It can also be argued that requiring level crossing warning devices to have the highest level 
of safety integrity for sites where this level of risk reduction is an over-kill, effectively creates a 
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distortion in safety spending. This potentially results in less-than-optimal safety performance per dollar 
spent.  
Based on a risk assessment conducted by the project team, a tolerable hazard rate for the hazard 
“Level crossing warning device does not provide adequate warning to road users of a rail vehicle 
approaching or traversing the level crossing” of < 1E-6 / hour (Safety Integrity Level 2) was 
determined to be acceptable for the cross section of level crossings with passive controls that were 
evaluated. (For information on safety integrity levels, and requirements and process for demonstrating 
reliability, availability, safety and maintainability of railway systems, refer to CENELEC standards 
EN50126-1 [8], EN50126-2 [9], EN50128 [10], and EN50129 [11].) 
The CRC for Rail Innovation is a coordinating a “Low-cost Railway Level Crossing Risk and Legal 
Evaluation” project (No. R2.121) in parallel to the national LCLCWD trialling project, with the aim of 
developing a preliminary generic application safety case for LCLCWDs and a decision-making 
framework supporting their adoption and deployment. The project involves international expert review 
of the safety argument and the provision of legal advice on issues such as Tort liability and whether 
railways meet their obligations under the national rail safety legislation to reduce risk so far as is 
reasonably practicable with the adoption of LCLCWDs. 
2.2 Magnitude of Cost Reduction 
There have been many claims as to how much LCLCWDs cost or ought to cost. The project team 
conducted preliminary lifecycle cost modelling based on reference costs that were determined from a 
breakdown of installation activities / materials and their associated costs from railways and a civil 
contractor. Using the reference costing model, lifecycle costs were determined for a baseline type-
approved GCP4000 level crossing and the LCLCWDs. 
The cost modelling included costs such as level crossing equipment, civil works, materials (cables, 
pits, concrete slabs, etc.), assembly and installation, track improvement works where applicable, 
project management, engineering and design for signalling / track and civil, testing and 
commissioning, preventative and corrective maintenance and running costs. Civil preparation works 
including kerbing and re-asphalting were not included in the cost modelling. 
While the detailed model cannot be made public at this time, the modelling resulted in LCLCWDs 
providing a significant reduction in lifecycle costs. Lifecycle costs of LCLCWDs were estimated to be 
between 40% and 70% of an equivalent grade predictor installation with flashing lights (baseline 
system). However, based on the actual installations of LCLCWD at trial sites so far, indications are 
that installation costs are substantially lower for the LCLCWDs than predicted. For example, one of 
the LCLCWDs with predicted lifecycle costs of approximately 70% of baseline costs, after installation 
at the trial sites, is now estimated to be about 58% of baseline costs. This was primarily due to over-
estimation of the time required to install and commission the LCLCWD, and over-estimation of the 
associated costs using the reference model. 
Additional scope for cost reduction has also been identified in the streamlining of design and 
engineering activities for similar types of crossings - the “level crossing in a box” concept. The final 
project report will provide a detailed cost breakdown for the systems that have been trialled. 
3 National LCLCWD Trial 
The primary purpose of the trial is to obtain nationally consistent operational data on LCLCWDs for a 
duration of 12 months, such that it can be used as safety qualification evidence in a future type 
approval should railways be interested in pursuing any of the trialled LCLCWDs. Safety qualification 
tests are important in providing evidence that the candidate LCLCWDs function as intended under 
operational conditions. These tests alone are not sufficient to demonstrate safety. Evidence of 
functional and technical safety is also required in a LCLCWD safety case.  
 CENELEC standard EN50129 [11] provides a description of the purpose of safety qualification tests: 
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 To gain increased confidence that the system/sub-system/equipment fulfils its specified 
operational requirements; 
 To gain increased confidence that the specified reliability and safety targets have been 
achieved; and 
 To allow systems/subsystems/equipment to be put into operational service before final safety 
approval, subject to provision of appropriate precautions and monitoring.  
As the LCLCWDs being trialled are not fully assured, appropriate precautions need to be taken in 
order to minimise risk. Shadow-mode testing is one such method of reducing risk and involves testing 
the LCLCWDs parallel to an existing type-approved level crossing warning device. This testing 
methodology allows LCLCWDs to be trialled in the operating conditions of a live level crossing without 
affecting the safety of road users or the railway. A logging system captures the operating performance 
of the trial systems compared with the existing baseline system.  
Shadow-mode testing does have limitations. While train detection and control aspects of the warning 
device can be adequately tested with this approach, the interface to the road user is not tested. The 
logging system is configured to capture flasher control outputs from the trial systems rather than the 
actual operating performance of the RX5 flashing light assemblies.  
Trial LCLCWDs are configured with resistive loads to simulate the flashing lights for testing of the 
power supply systems. This ensures that performance data on solar power supply systems is as close 
to actual operation as possible.  
3.1 Selection Process 
A tendering process for participation in the trial was facilitated by the CRC for Rail Innovation. A 
request for information (RFI) document was developed by the steering committee and provided to 
suppliers. Once interested suppliers had entered into a non-disclosure agreement, additional 
documents including a checklist of required supporting documentation and the LCLCWD requirement 
specification were provided. While a large number suppliers showed interest in the trial programme, 
seven made an official submission providing the requested documentation. The project had subsidies 
to support up to three suppliers at three trial sites (a total of nine trial systems). The selection process, 
illustrated Figure 1, was used to shortlist the participants. 
An information pack was produced for committee members including supplier responses to the RFI. 
Committee members were tasked with evaluating a part of the response for each supplier before the 
evaluation workshop. The evaluation committee consisted people ranging from signal engineers to 
type approval managers, level crossing managers and human factors specialists. The evaluation 
workshop involved the committee evaluating and scoring each system in three working groups, 
identifying any issues including differences in procedures or context of host railways that could have 
an impact on performance or safety of the railway or LCLCWD.  
 Railway Installation Evaluation Group: This group was tasked with the identification of positive 
and negative aspects of the LCLCWDs from an installation and maintenance perspective; 
 Technology Evaluation Group: This group was tasked with evaluating positive and negative 
aspects of the LCLCWD technologies including evaluation of LCLCWD safety evidence; and 
 Human Factors and Road User Perspective Group: This group was tasked with the 
identification of positive and negative aspects of the LCLCWDs from a human factors 
perspective.  
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Figure 1. Supplier selection process 
 
The committee then deliberated, reviewing the output from the working groups, the lifecycle costing 
model and the evaluation criteria. The lifecycle costing model and evaluation criteria had been applied 
to the seven LCLCWDs before the workshop. The criteria were comprehensive and included the 
following aspects of the product / supplier: 
 Conformance to LCLCWD requirements; 
 Conformance to relevant standards and the project brief; 
 Product performance, product track record, approvals and use in other railways; 
 Supplier track record, quality and safety management system accreditations; 
 Technology benefits (excluding cost reduction); 
 Lifecycle costs; 
 Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety – evidence of RAMS; 
 Product design including anti-vandalism and ergonomics (human factors design); and 
 Product documentation including design, drawings, approvals (e.g. EMC), factory acceptance 
testing, maintenance and service schedules, product training and competency assessment, 
etc. 
3.2 Selected Suppliers 
The evaluation committee selected the following suppliers:  
 Sice Pty. Ltd.  
 KH1 Pty. Ltd. (for supply of the Schweizer FlexMICRO LCLCWD)  
 ITS Innovations Pty. Ltd.  
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The table below summarises the LCLCWD technologies that are being trialled. 
 Sice LCLCWD KH1 (Schweizer 
FlexMICRO) 
ITS Innovations LCLCWD 
Train detection 
technology 
Frauscher RSR123 wheel 
sensors 
Frauscher RSR180 wheel 
sensors 
System 1 - Track-mounted 
Anisotrophic Magneto 
Resistive (AMR) sensors; 
System 2 - Radar mounted 
outside danger zone 
LCLCWD component 
connectivity 
Wireless (Level crossing 
supports installation with or 
without cables) 
Cables (clipped to rail or 
buried route) 
Wireless 
Power supply Solar Solar Solar  
Safety integrity
1
 SIL4 (THR < 1E-8 / hour) SIL3 (THR < 1E-7 / hour) SIL2 (THR < 1E-6 / hour) 
Notes Modular design upgradable to 
level crossing suitable for 
deployment at high-exposure 
sites.  
Meets MICRO low-cost level 
crossing specification / 
standard in Switzerland. For 
the trial, railways are 
permitted cables to be 
clipped to the rail. 
AMR sensors are wireless. 
Internal batteries provide a 
seven-year nominal operating 
life. 
Radar train detection solution 
is mounted outside danger 
zone. 
 
3.3 Trial Sites 
Three trial sites that met the trial requirements were identified. Level crossing sites needed to be 
single-track level crossings with an active warning that operates using track circuits. Track circuits 
were deemed necessary as part of the data collection methodology to ensure a consistent and 
reliable source of baseline data. The methodology is discussed in more detail in the next section. 3G 
mobile communications coverage was also required to support remote data logging. 
The sites were chosen in order to obtain a wide range of rolling stock, speeds and operating 
conditions. The Queensland Rail (QR) site (Figure 2) is located near Maryborough on the North Coast 
Line and is a bi-directional section of narrow-gauge track with 25KV AC overhead power. A range of 
rolling stock passes though this level crossing including the Diesel and electric passenger Tilt-trains 
and freight trains. The site precedes a curved section and a cutting with a top speed of 60 km/h (70 
km/h for the Tilt-trains), providing a challenging environment for the wireless systems in the absence 
of line of sight. 
 
Figure 2. Queensland Rail trial site 
                                                     
1
 Tolerable hazard rate (THR) for hazard “Level crossing does not provide adequate warning to road users of a rail vehicle 
approaching or traversing the level crossing”. 
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The Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) site is located on bi-directional standard gauge track 
on the North Coast Line near Kempsey in NSW (Figure 3). It also has a range of rolling stock (both 
freight and passenger services) with a line speed of 115 km/h for freight trains and 125 km/h for 
passenger trains. 
 
 
Figure 3. ARTC trial site 
 
The V/Line trial site is located near Geelong in Victoria on bi-directional broad gauge track on the 
Geelong-Ballarat freight corridor (Figure 4). This site has relatively low frequencies of freight-only rail 
traffic.  
In addition to the installation of comparative logging equipment and LCLCWDs in shadow mode, 
environmental monitoring stations have been installed at the trial sites. The monitoring stations log 
temperature, humidity, rainfall, solar radiation, wind speed and wind direction, providing observation 
data via a 3G mobile communication network to a central server. Figure 5 is a photo of the weather 
monitoring station installed at the Queensland Rail trial site. Environmental monitoring ensures that 
the range of environmental conditions the LCLCWDs have been exposed to are captured, allowing for 
correlation of deviations in performance or unexpected events with environmental conditions. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the safety qualification data can be provided with an accurate envelope of 
environmental conditions under which the equipment was known to have operated.   
 
 
Figure 4. V/Line trial site in Victoria 
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Figure 5. Environmental monitoring station at QR trial site (Photo taken by Matthew Thompson, QR) 
4 Data Collection Methodology 
Comparative logging equipment is installed at each trial site and logs state changes of inputs from the 
LCLCWDs flasher outputs, the baseline warning system (flasher control relay) and track circuit 
occupation states (track circuit relays). In addition, a failure input line from each of the LCLCWDs is 
logged in case of a detected failure (e.g. hi-rail vehicle enters from the level crossing such that there 
is no strike-in). The programmable logic controller (PLC) is configured to trigger a logging action on 
state changes (rising-edges and falling-edge) of all input signals. The logging action adds a 
timestamp and the state of all inputs to the log buffer. The comparative logger for all trail sites has 
been provided by V/Line to ensure consistency of data captured across the sites (Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Equipment used for comparative logging (Photo taken by Peter Upton, V/Line) 
Figure 7 illustrates the timing relationships of flasher and track circuit inputs observed by the 
comparative logger. Supplier train detection devices were installed adjacent to the existing baseline 
train detection equipment to ensure that the time of train detection was comparative. 
The comparative logging capability will allow the following parameters and conditions to be monitored: 
1) Warning time (time from when the train is detected to when it enters the island circuit)   
a) Variation of warning time with respect to baseline system; 
b) Instances in which at least 20 seconds of warning was not given; and 
c) Instances in which there was excessive warning. 
2) Warning deactivation time (time from when the train passes the clearance point to when the 
warning is deactivated) 
a) Variation of deactivation time with respect to baseline system; 
b) Instances in which warning was extinguished before train passed clearance point; and 
c) Instances in which warning continued for excessive time after train passed clearance 
point (tail ringing). 
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3) Right side failures 
a) Instances where warning is falsely provided (both intermittent and prolonged false 
positives). 
4) Wrong side failures 
a) Instances where a warning is not given for an approaching / traversing train; and 
b) Instances where a warning is not provided continuously from when the train activates the 
warning system until the rear of the train has passed the crossing clearance point. 
 
 
Figure 7. Timing diagram 
Note: t(RE(FC_S1)) refers to the time of the rising edge of the flasher control input from the LCLCWD 
of supplier 1. FE refers to falling-edge, TC_U/I/D refer to up, island and down track circuits, S1-3 
refers to supplier 1-3 and BL refers to baseline. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has provided an overview of the CRC for Rail Innovation’s national low-cost level crossing 
trial programme, the selection process, selected suppliers, trial sites and the data collection 
methodology. The trial will collect data on the performance of LCLCWDs for a period of 12 months 
before trial systems are decommissioned and removed. Completion of the trail programme is 
expected in November 2014. 
For more information on the national low-cost level crossing trial program, please contact the CRC for 
Rail Innovation or visit their web page: http://www.railcrc.net.au. 
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